The Fleets at War
Archibald Hurd
9781465657756
213 pages
Library of Alexandria
Overview
The declaration of war against Germany, followed as it was by similar action against Austria-Hungary, was preceded by a sequence of events so remarkable in their character that if any British writer had made any such forecast in times of peace he would have been written down as a romantic optimist. Owing to a series of fortunate circumstances, the British Fleet—our main line of defence and offence—was fully mobilised for war on the morning before the day—August 4th at 11 p.m.—when war was declared by this country, and we were enabled to enter upon the supreme contest in our history with a sense of confidence which was communicated to all the peoples of the British Empire. This feeling of assurance and courage furnished the best possible augury for the future. Within a fortnight of diplomatic relations being broken off with Germany, and less than a week after Austria-Hungary by her acts had declared her community of interest with her ally, the British Navy, without firing a gun or sending a single torpedo hissing through the water, had achieved four victories. (1) Germany’s elaborate scheme to produce a feeling of panic in this country—hence the army of spies, who took advantage of our open hospitality, using the telephone and providing themselves with bombs and arms, had failed. (2) Germany’s over-sea commerce was strangled. (3) British trade on the seas began to resume its normal course owing to the growing confidence of shipowners and shippers. (4) The British Expeditionary Force, as detailed for foreign service, had been transported to the Continent under a guarantee of safety given by the British Fleet. These successes were due to the influence of sea-power. Confidence in the Navy, its ships and men, and a belief in the competency of Mr. Winston Churchill and Prince Louis of Battenberg and the other Sea Lords, and the War Staff, steadied the nerve of the nation when it received the first shock. Apparently the crisis developed so swiftly that there was no time for effective co-operation between the German spies. All the mischievous stories of British reverses which were clumsily put in circulation in the early period of hostilities were tracked down; for once truth was nearly as swift as rumour, though the latter was the result of an elaborately organised scheme for throwing the British people off their mental balance. It was conjectured that if a feeling of panic could be created in this country, a frightened nation would bring pressure to bear on the naval and military authorities and our strategic plans ashore and afloat would be interfered with. A democracy in a state of panic cannot make war. The carefully-laid scheme miscarried. Never was a nation more self-possessed. It had faith in its Fleet. In the history of sea power, there is nothing comparable with the strangulation of German oversea shipping in all the seas of the world. It followed almost instantly on the declaration of war. There were over 2,000 German steamers, of nearly 5,000,000 tons gross, afloat when hostilities opened. The German sailing ships—mostly of small size—numbered 2,700. These vessels were distributed over the seas far and wide. Some—scores of them, in fact—were captured, others ran for neutral ports, the sailings of others were cancelled, and the heart of the German mercantile navy suddenly stopped beating. What must have been the feelings of Herr Ballin and the other pioneers as they contemplated the ruin, at least temporary ruin, of years of splendid enterprise? The strategical advantages enjoyed by England in a war against Germany, lying as she does like a bunker across Germany’s approach to the oversea world, had never been understood by the mass of Germans, nor by their statesmen. Shipowners had some conception of what would happen, but even they did not anticipate that in less than a week the great engine of commercial activity oversea would be brought to a standstill.
