Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet
9781465643100
313 pages
Library of Alexandria
Overview
Ideal goodness is to do good for its own sake: but there must be acts considered good on other grounds before they can be done for the sake of their goodness 3. When, however, the ideal comes to be recognised as the ideal, the lower interests and rules must be criticised and revised by it 4. The criticism of interests will yield a 'theory of moral sentiments'; that of rules will relate (1) to positive law, (2) to the law of opinion 5. As moral interests greatly depend on recognised rules of conduct, and those again on positive law, it is best to begin by considering the moral value of existing civil institutions 6. The condition of morality is the possession of will and reason, and it is realised in a personal character in which they are harmonised 7. Civil institutions are valuable so far as they enable will and reason to be exercised, and so far they answer to 'jus naturae' 8. The essential questions as to the 'law of nature' are, (1) Are there rights and obligations other than those actually enforced? (2) If so, what is the criterion of them? 9. While rejecting the theory of a 'state of nature,' we may still use 'natural' of those rights which ought to be, though they actually are not 10. Such 'natural law' is (as admitting enforcement) distinct from, but (as implying a duty to obey it) relative to, the moral law 11. Hence two principles for the criticism of law, (1) only external acts can be matter of obligation proper, (2) the ideal of law must be determined by reference to the moral end which it serves 12. Observe (a) that in confining law to 'external actions,' we mean by 'actions' intentions, without which there is properly no 'action' 13. (b) That by 'external' we mean that law, though it does supply motives to action, looks merely to whether the action is done, not to whether it is done from a particular motive 14. Law then can only enjoin or forbid certain acts; it cannot enjoin or forbid motives 15. And the only acts which it ought to enjoin or forbid are those of which the doing or not doing, from whatever motive, is necessary to the moral end of society 16. The principle of 'natural law,' then, should be to enjoin all acts which further action from the highest motive, and no acts which interfere with such action 17. This principle would condemn much legislation which has tended, e.g., to weaken religion, self-respect, or family feeling.
