The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics
9781465602428
418 pages
Library of Alexandria
Overview
The present translation aims at supplying an introductory volume to a later period of the history of mind in Greece, which may be collectively described as the post-Aristotelian. To the moralist and theologian no less than to the student of philosophy this period is one of peculiar interest; for it supplied the scientific mould into which Christianity in the early years of its growth was cast, and bearing the shape of which it has come down to us. Merits and defects of the systems of Plato and Aristotle. In Plato and Aristotle Greek Philosophy reached its greatest perfection. In their hands the Socratic philosophy of conceptions grew into elaborate systems, which embraced the whole range of contemporary knowledge, and grouped it from definite points of view so as to afford a connected view of the universe. The study of nature was by them supplemented by careful enquiries into the subject of morals. It was, moreover, transformed, enlarged, and enriched by Aristotle. In metaphysics, the foundations for a philosophical structure were deeply laid, everything being referred to first principles, in a way which no previous philosopher had before attempted. A multitude of phenomena which earlier thinkers had carelessly passed over, more particularly the phenomena of mental life, were pressed into the service of research; new questions were raised; new answers given. New ideas had penetrated every branch of knowledge. That idealism in which the Greek mind so beautifully and lucidly found expression had been set forth by Plato in brilliant purity, and had been by Aristotle combined with careful observation. Practice and theory had brought the dialectical method to the position of an art. A valuable instrument of thought had been gained in the scientific use of terms of which Aristotle was the real originator. Within a few generations the intellectual treasures of Greece had been manifoldly increased, both in extent and value. The heritage received by Socrates from his predecessors could hardly be recognised as the same in that which Aristotle left to his successors. Great as was the progress made by Greek philosophy in the fourth century before Christ, quite as great were the difficulties with which it had perpetually to contend; quite as difficult the problems on the solution of which it had to labour. Aristotle had already pointed out the weak points in the system of Plato, which rendered it impossible for him to accept that system as satisfactory. From the platform of later knowledge still further objections might be raised to it. Even in Aristotle’s own system inconsistencies on some of the most important points might be found, concealed under a certain indefiniteness of expression, but fatal if once brought to light to the soundness of the whole. For with all his ingenuity, Aristotle never succeeded in harmoniously blending all the elements out of which his system was composed. Thus the divergencies of his immediate followers from the original Aristotelian teaching may be accounted for. Nor were these defects of a kind that could be easily disposed of. The deeper the enquiry is carried, the clearer it becomes that they were defects embedded in the foundations of the systems both of Plato and Aristotle, and underlying the whole previous range of philosophic thought. Omitting details and minor points, they may all be ultimately referred to two: either to an imperfect knowledge and experience of the world, or to the overhaste of idealistic philosophy to draw conclusions.
