The Americans in the Great War: The Second Battle of the Marne, The Battle of Saint Mihiel, The Meuse-Argonne Battlefields
9781465506597
213 pages
Library of Alexandria
Overview
The two great German offensives of March and April both failed, despite their extreme violence and the fact that the Allies were taken by surprise. Neither Amiens on the Somme, nor Béthune and Ypres in the north had fallen. Although in the course of these two offensives not less than 152 German divisions had been thrown into battle, the enemy failed to pierce the Allies’ front or break down their resistance. During the offensive against the British front, French reinforcements were brought up much sooner than the Germans expected. Moreover, the battles of March and April gave the Allies the decisive advantage of unity of command. To Marshal Foch was entrusted the co-ordination of the Allied forces in the last act of the great drama, which was to see the downfall of Ludendorff and Hindenburg. To calm public opinion at home, where the people were clamouring ever louder for that victorious peace so often promised, the Germans were forced to make another attempt, and it was considered necessary to act promptly while they still had numerical superiority—owing to Russia’s defection—and win the final decision before the American intervention could make itself fully felt. Before attacking the British again, Ludendorff attempted to draw the French reserves southwards, his plan being to wear them down and then settle with the British alone. Hence the attack of May 27 on the Aisne front, which was powerfully organised on the German side owing to the great advantage they possessed in being able to bring up rapidly their heavy artillery from the Somme. Moreover, the ground was familiar to the enemy, who likewise knew that this part of the Allies’ front was only weakly held. The Allies’ reserves being insufficient to cover the entire front, and considering that the German offensive might be launched against either the Lys, the Somme, the Oise, or the Aisne fronts, Foch had concentrated his forces at the vitally important points covering Paris, the channel ports, and other positions less easy to defend than the Chemin-des-Dames.
