What America Did: A Record of Achievement in the Prosecution of the War
9781465685278
213 pages
Library of Alexandria
Overview
When the United States entered the war, April 6th, 1917, she had an army, including all the forces of the Regular Army, the National Guard and the Reserve Corps, totaling 202,510 men and 9,524 officers, a navy not large but well prepared, and the nucleus of an aeronautical section so small and undeveloped that it was negligible. Behind these fighting forces that, except the navy, were insignificant in comparison with the vast numbers of men swaying back and forth across the battlefields of Europe was a nation that ever since its birth had held the profound conviction, a fundamental of its political creed, that this country should never allow itself to be drawn into the quarrels of Europe. Generation after generation had watched transatlantic wars blaze up and go their bloody way and had seen their flames fed by racial hates and jealousies, commercial greed, desire of territory, and dynastic and personal ambitions. And each successive generation had detested more deeply the whole foul crew of those motives and had been more determined that America should have no concern in the struggles they inspired. No one who does not understand how deeply rooted was this conviction in the political beliefs and ideals, the traditions, the very life of the American people can appreciate what it meant to them to plunge into the war. It demanded no less than a revolution in their methods of thought and in their attitude toward the rest of the world. The Monroe Doctrine, moreover, which for nearly a century had been almost as fundamental in our political life as the Constitution itself, made our abstention from interference in Europe a point of honor. For in its declaration that Europe must keep its hands off the western hemisphere was the implied and recognized obligation that the United States must keep its fingers out of Europe. Until within a few months of our entrance into the war the vast majority of our people, probably no less than nine-tenths of those who were reading and thinking about it, saw in it nothing more than one of those recurring European quarrels, such as their fathers, grandfathers, and great-grandfathers had watched from this side the Atlantic with growing determination that this country should not be entangled in their strife. All that vast majority believed profoundly that the United States should hold aloof from this war for the same reasons that it had kept out of the previous bloody struggles. The American people can scarcely be blamed that they did not for a long time perceive the real cause of the war—the desire of the German Emperor and his people to win world dominion and establish a German autocracy over the conquered peoples. For no nation, and very few individuals, even among the near neighbors of Germany, at first realized that this was the goal of the Kaiser and his Government. Some of those nations had now and then apprehended danger, but only each one for itself, but upon the fingers of one hand could be counted the statesmen and publicists of Europe who perceived the intention of world conquest, until the field-gray legions had been started upon the adventure. And those few who had declared such a conviction concerning German purpose had had their trouble for their pains. For no one had heeded their warning. Slowly, as evidence accumulated that convicted Germany out of her own mouth and was surveyed in the light of the event to which it all pointed, did the governments and peoples that were being attacked come to a realization of the truth.
