Russia’s Part in the World War
9781465607782
55 pages
Library of Alexandria
Overview
In discussing Russia's role in the past World War, it is customary to cite the losses sustained by the Russian Army, losses numbering many millions. There is no doubt that Russia's sacrifices were great, and it is just as true that her losses were greater than those sustained by any of the other Allies. Nevertheless, these sacrifices are by far not the only standard of measurement of Russia's participation in this gigantic struggle. Russia's role must be gauged, first of all, by the efforts made by the Russian Army to blast the German war plans during the first years of the War, when neither America, nor Italy, nor Roumania were among the belligerents, and the British Army was still in the process of formation. Russia's role must in addition be gauged by the efforts put forth by the Russian Army to save the situation at other critical moments of the War. And of such, we know, there were not a few until the Allies succeeded in gaining their victory over the stubborn and powerful enemy. Lastly, and this is the main thing, the role played by the Russian Army must be considered also in this respect that the strenuous campaign waged by Russia, with her 180 millions of inhabitants, for three years against Germany, Austro-Hungary and Turkey, sapped the resources of the enemy and thereby made possible the delivery of the final blow. This weakening of the powers of the enemy by Russia was already bound at various stages of the War to facilitate correspondingly the various operations of the Allies. Therefore at the end of the War three years of effort on the part of Russia, which had devoured the enemy's forces, were destined to enable the Allies finally to crush the enemy. The final catastrophe of the Central Powers was the direct consequence of the offensive of the Allies in 1918, but Russia made possible this collapse to a considerable degree, having effected, in common with the others, the weakening of Germany, and having consumed during the three years of strenuous fighting countless reserves, forces and resources of the Central Powers. Could Germany have won the war? A careful analysis of this question brings home the conviction that Germany was very close to victory, and that it required unusual straining of efforts on the part of France and Russia to prevent Germany from "winning out." The plan of the old Field Marshal, Moltke, was far from worthless. It is a fact that it took from six weeks to two months to mobilize the armed forces of Russia, during which period Russia was unprepared for action. The population of Germany was 70 million and that of Austria-Hungary 52 million, a total of 122 million persons. During these two months of forced inaction those 122 millions of Teutons were faced only by 40 million Frenchmen, for Russia was not yet ready. A threefold superiority in numbers, in addition to an equal degree of military skill, technical equipment and culture, was bound to crush lone France. It is true that for the complete realization of this scheme it was necessary that the Austrian Army, as well, involve France. This should have been anticipated, as military science does not admit of the division of forces. Just to the contrary, it demands "the concentration of all forces in the decisive hour and at the deciding point,"-in France, upon this particular occasion.
